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Abstract: Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, anthro-
pologists failed to elaborate on theoretical concepts such as the ‘human 
condition’. In face of the fact that they did not abandon their scientific 
calling or the label ‘anthropology’, this must surely be taken as surpris-
ing. The article argues that this silence is possible due to an ideational 
performance here called the ‘all-or-nothing syndrome’. This depends 
on a skeptical fallacy: the condition of those who, because they cannot 
have it all, despair of having what is there to be had. The article also 
explores the Davidsonian notions of ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘underdetermi-
nation’ as possible paths out of this quandary. It suggests an approach 
to ethnographic knowledge based on the principles that underscore the 
mechanisms of control that engineers call ‘fuzzy logic’.
Keywords: all-or-nothing syndrome, Davidson, human condition, indeter-
minacy, truth, underdetermination
For the past 50 years, most socio-cultural anthropologists have avoided address-
ing frontally the issue of our common humanity, which was central to the 
launching of the discipline. More recently, the very notion that the concept 
‘human condition’ might be a useful heuristic device has come to be ques-
tioned by many of us. On the whole, even those who did not go as far as that 
failed to turn their explicit attention to the issue.
Over the decades, the accumulation of ethnographies taught anthropologists 
about the profound diversity of culturally specific definitions of humanity. More 
recently, a feeling of gloom concerning the ‘scientific’ value of anthropological 
knowledge became prevalent. After a half-century of continued self-reflexive 
critique, anthropologists were caught in their own trap. They became loath to 
claim any special kind of authority concerning the parameters of humanity that 
they adopt in the course of their studies, as opposed to the specific versions of 
humanity espoused by the people whom they study. 
164   |   João de Pina-Cabral
One of the more sophisticated contemporary thinkers in our discipline, 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, puts it in the following terms: “[T]he aim of con-
temporary anthropology cannot continue to be that of finding the substitute 
[succedaneum] for the pineal gland that makes humans ‘different’ from the 
rest of ‘nature’. As much as it might interest nature, such a difference cannot 
make much difference. Anthropologists will be far better occupied studying 
the differences that humans are effectively capable of producing; the difference 
between them and the remaining live beings is only one among many, and 
not necessarily the clearest, the most stable or the most important of them” 
(Viveiros de Castro 2007: 109). Of course, one has to agree that the Cartesian 
search for the ‘pineal gland’, the ultimate causal link with nature, is vacuous. 
And one must agree further still that the difference between humans and other 
living beings might be construed as being small, if seen from the perspective 
of God or of nature. But seen from the perspective of humans, I doubt whether 
it can simply be pushed aside as irrelevant. “The differences that humans are 
effectively capable of producing,” as Viveiros de Castro (ibid.) so aptly puts it, 
can be studied only if we have identified the notion of ‘human’ and the fact 
that it is humans identifying themselves as such that is at stake. 
In the wake of Marilyn Strathern’s theorization (see, especially, Strathern 
1992a), this type of approach came to be identified as a call for ontology (that 
which exists) and a rejection of the possibility of epistemology (that which can 
be known). Briefly put, it would supposedly be unethical for ‘Euro-American’ 
anthropologists to claim precedence for the knowledge that they produce over 
the knowledge produced by the ‘Other’ whom they study. 
This state of affairs, to my mind, is deeply unsatisfactory as it sits on a series 
of self-contradictory postures. It fails to account for the specificity (and essen-
tial cosmopolitanism) of the knowledge produced by scholars and scientists. It 
does not explain how it is at all possible to produce ethnographic knowledge. 
It makes ethical claims that breach the cultural divide without accounting for 
what justifies them. Finally, it is essentially paternalistic in the presupposi-
tion that all contemporary heirs to the anthropology of the past have to be 
Euro-American or, in any case, have to position themselves in an essentially 
‘Western’ subject position (cf. Pina-Cabral 2006). The problem, however, is not 
simply to do with our failure to theorize the way in which we generalize about 
human behavior. It goes much further. These postures—much like the similarly 
dystopian fantasy that human specificity has been eroded by the arrival of 
thinking machines—are dependent on a discursivist notion of human interac-
tion that, as will be argued later, is wholly illegitimate.1
In this article, I argue that behind the acceptance of these limitations lies a 
form of self-defeat that I have named the ‘all-or-nothing syndrome’—that is, 
the condition of those who, because they cannot have the whole truth, despair 
of having any truth at all. This relies on a logical procedure that is fallacious, 
the after-effects of which lead to a pervasive leaning toward skepticist solu-
tions—in Donald Davidson’s (2001: 45) phrase, “the fallacy of reasoning from 
the fact that there is nothing we might not be wrong about to the conclusion 
that we might be wrong about everything.”
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Truth
Over the past two decades, the all-or-nothing syndrome has become hegemonic 
in our discipline. The post-war generation had been brought up in the hope 
that, through science, they would come to know truth, absolute truth, with 
which they would be able to control the world. They did control the world 
increasingly, that much is certain. But absolute control and absolute truth 
evaded them, and, what is worse, they could no longer trust the world beyond 
science. From the point of view of a heightened physicalist type of material-
ism, the impossibility of reducing all truth to physical objects came as a major 
setback. They had endowed truth with such grandeur and such powers that, in 
the end, nothing could satisfy them enough. 
This is how Paul Veyne (1988: 27) expresses it in his brilliant essay on the 
belief in myths in ancient Greece:
[M]odalities of belief are related to the ways in which truth is possessed. 
Throughout the ages a plurality of programs of truth has existed, and it is these 
programs, involving different distributions of knowledge, that explain the sub-
jective degrees of intensity of beliefs, the bad faith, and the contradictions that 
exist in the same individual. We agree with Michel Foucault on this point. The 
history of ideas truly begins with the historicization of the philosophical idea of 
truth. There is no such thing as a sense of the real. Furthermore, there is no rea-
son—quite the contrary—for representing what is past or foreign as analogous 
to what is current or near.
Approaches of this kind, which maintain that truth is simply not a property, that 
it does not point to any real characteristic of our thoughts or beliefs (cf. Lynch 
1998: 111–118), are labeled ‘deflationist’ by philosophers. A singular result of hold-
ing such views is that, being disappointed with the material world, people who 
maintain them turn for refuge to the world of meaning. A tendency then arises to 
focus on discursive behavior—on language games, but not in a Wittgensteinian 
sense.2 In anthropology, this turn of attention opened up a number of fascinating 
perspectives, but, in the end, it came to pose practical problems, as it threw into 
question the very purpose of the anthropological enterprise. Are we, after all, just 
pleasantly engaged in constructing yet another self-enclosed program of truth? 
I propose that we now address the issue of truth frontally by starting with 
W. V. Quine’s notion of ‘the indeterminacy of translation’. Analytical philoso-
phers such as Quine argue that the various aspects of mental phenomena 
are essentially interdependent in such a way that a person cannot possibly 
have anything like “a single, isolated, thought” (Davidson 2004: 7–12); that is, 
“each belief require[s] a world of further beliefs to give it content and identity” 
(Davidson 2001: 98).3 This they refer to as ‘the holism of the mental’. If the 
meaning that we attribute to a concept is indissociable from all other mean-
ing—that is, if it is holistic—then no two persons and no two communities of 
speakers can ever attribute the precise same meaning to a concept. Of course, 
philosophers of language do not stop here. They go on to show how interpreta-
tion is actually possible, not in spite of but due to this basic indeterminacy.
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The reason why this notion is useful to my argument at this point is that if 
anthropologists were to take their skepticism seriously—and not as a literary 
conceit, as I believe they do—then the indeterminacy of translation would mean 
that there could not be any communication both between cultures and between 
individual human beings. In short, why do anthropologists accept the notion of 
grounding their skepticism at the level of cultures yet fail to understand that if 
there is reason to be skeptical at that level, there is also reason to be skeptical 
at the individual level? And if that is the case, why do they write at all?
The time has come for us to make our way back again to a more serious 
engagement with our own scientific task. For that, we have to abandon our 
idealist romance with virtuality and return to our marriage with empirical 
research and critical analysis. My claim is that there is no possible description 
of what actually occurs in the ethnographic encounter that does not presume 
some form of realism. In stating this, I am not making any sort of positivistic 
declaration of access to unmitigated truth or to a disembodied condition. All 
I ask for is the recognition that if we do not ascribe at least to a minimal kind 
of realism, of a type akin to what philosophers such as Michael Lynch (1998) 
have advocated, we will never be able to understand what we do when we go 
to the field; learn a people’s language or adapt a language we already know 
to their local speech; learn to use local etiquette; learn to live with their food, 
their daily and monthly routines, their climatic conditions, their basic domestic 
tasks, their regular use of plants and other consumables, and so on.
One might argue that the minimalist realism that I am advocating is a truism. 
When faced with the magnitude and complexity of human intercultural differ-
ence, this requirement for a basically shared world is so primitive, so hidden 
beneath the layers of subsequent meaning, that it can simply be forgotten and 
left aside. That is how Marilyn Strathern (1999: 171), for example, apparently 
sees it. Yet this argument is not convincing, for anthropologists, of all people, 
should be aware that it is on the bedrock of such minutiae that the possibility 
of ethnography stands. A fieldwork situation wherein the ethnographer’s world 
and the native’s world are mutually unknown in an extreme fashion is not 
conceivable. The social context being studied is always already largely familiar 
to the ethnographer. On top of that, growing globalization over the past five 
centuries has meant that the ethnographic encounter has been increasingly 
mediated by an immeasurably complex chain of interactions.
Sharing a world is an essential condition, not only for thinking and speak-
ing, but also for interpreting, and thus it is an unavoidable condition of the eth-
nographic exercise. Davidson (2001: 213) explains that “our view of the world 
is, in its plainest features, largely correct. The reason is that the stimuli that 
cause our most basic verbal responses also determine what those responses 
mean, and the contents of the beliefs that accompany them. The nature of 
interpretation guarantees both that a large number of our simplest perceptual 
beliefs are true, and that the nature of these beliefs is known to others.”
Ironically, what the word ‘world’ should be taken to mean is something 
that, in a way, I think anthropologists and historians should have been better 
equipped to explore than analytical philosophers. Behind the play of words 
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that goes from the singular ‘world’ to the plural ‘worlds’, we can identify 
another version of the all-or-nothing syndrome. Of all people, anthropologists-
as-ethnographers, as much as anthropologists-as-theorists, should be prepared 
to know that a condition of there being ‘worlds’ (in the plural) is that there 
should be ‘world’ (in the singular), for we would never have been able to 
reach any knowledge concerning the world’s plurality if we had been stuck 
in a solipsistic universe, which would necessarily be singular. The deflationist 
interpretation of the indeterminacy of translation—which chooses to be skepti-
cal about the possibility of intercultural knowledge but takes as unproblematic 
the possibility of intersubjective knowledge and of temporally discontinuous 
interpersonal knowledge—is not logically sustainable and can have crept into 
anthropology only as a kind of unstated dogma due to the institutional need to 
preserve the concept of ‘culture’, a form of conformism. 
I find recent criticisms of the Malinowskian concept of holism essentially 
misguided.4 The adaptation of the term for ethnographic methodology that Mal-
inowski proposed brings to the fore the fact that meaning, thoughts, beliefs, 
concepts, and institutions are both internal aspects of the mind and part of an 
intersubjectively shared world. As Christina Toren (2002: 122) emphasizes: 
“Mind is a function of the whole person constituted over time in intersubjective 
relations with others in the environing world.” In the course of social life, our 
propositional attitudes become objectified as part of the socially appropriated 
environment that surrounds us, both in words and practices, and in objects. 
Thus, it is not only that in order for two minds to communicate they require a 
world external to them, but also that this world is always marked by the pro-
cesses of communication that pre-date the new act of communication.
An important corollary of this is that, as the holism of the mental applies to 
all forms of thought, one is also engaged to be a holist as far as one’s academic 
or scientific endeavors are concerned. Thus, all anthropological concepts are 
related in a variety of complex ways to all others that have preceded them. But 
there is more. Any understanding on your part about what I write is dependent 
on your sharing with me not only the concepts, as learned in books or lectures, 
but also a common world—that is, a context, a condition before the world.5
The call for the historicization of the ‘philosophical idea of truth’ made by 
scholars such as Michel Foucault and Paul Veyne is no doubt correct; there 
is no thought outside of history, if by history we mean an always already 
socially constructed environment of human interconnectedness. I disagree only 
because they consider that to be a historicist concerning knowledge one has 
to deny meaning to the concept of truth. But the fact that one can encounter 
(even at the same time, in the same person) what they call different ‘programs 
of truth’ does not imply that there is no truth at all. Their historicism runs 
counter to truth only because they confuse the existence of difference with the 
absence of relevant similarity: they will have all or nothing. 
Veyne (1988: 128) reckons that “[t]he idea of truth appears only when one 
takes the other person into account. It is not primary; it reveals a secret weak-
ness … Truth is the thin layer of gregarious self-satisfaction that separates us 
from the will to power.” Where he goes wrong is not in his historicism, but in 
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his entrenched individualism. That will not stand. There is no such thing as 
thought that does not take “the other person into account.” Gregariousness is 
no “thin layer”; rather, it is the bedrock that makes interpretation possible and 
without which there would be no thought. “The possibility of thought comes 
with company,” insists Davidson (2001: 88). And, sure enough, there is no 
sociality without power.
In order to be able to interpret others, however, it is not enough to share a 
world. One must also attribute to other people’s acts some basic logical con-
sistency, that is, some form of rationality. A condition for the interpretation of 
others is to accept that they, too, interpret us in much the same way. There can 
be thought only where there is sociality, and for that to be the case, many of 
my beliefs about the world must be true. Thus, we all share the means to start 
constructing bridges for interpretation. This being the case, all socio-cultural 
difference and all interpersonal difference in thought will always be a matter 
of relative difference and relative similarity. The fact that our world is socially 
constructed should never be held to mean that it is not a common world. To 
study socio-cultural difference is to study relevant socio-cultural difference and 
similarity. That means that, much as it may evolve in the course of history, 
there will always be a human condition.
Anthropology can happen only because there is a human condition, that is, a 
relation not only between humans and the world, but also among humans—an 
ethical relation, inasmuch as it applies to all humans. Morality as formulated 
in codified fashion is a socio-culturally specific phenomenon. Yet ethical relat-
edness is something that goes way beyond socio-cultural difference and that 
sits on our common human condition. As Mary Midgley (1983) and Philippa 
Foot (2001) have argued, we would even find it difficult to imagine anything 
one might count as culture that would not assume some version of the Golden 
Rule—that is, treat others as you want to be treated by them. Why have anthro-
pologists failed to explore such an obvious precondition for the very feasibility 
of ethnography? We have failed to concern ourselves with the investigation of 
the basic problem of how knowledge of the ‘other’ is acquired. Our anthropo-
logical ‘other’ continues to be sociocentrically defined in terms of corporate 
collectivities, even among recent critics of sociocentrism, oddly enough. 
I use the expression ‘human condition’ in reference to the work of Han-
nah Arendt (1958: 9), where she states: “Men are conditioned beings because 
everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of 
their existence.” I rather prefer this term to that of ‘human nature’6 for the rea-
sons that Arendt gives for her own choice: “It is highly unlikely that we, who 
can know, determine, and define the natural essences of all things surrounding 
us, which we are not, should ever be able to do the same for ourselves—this 
would be like jumping over our own shadows” (ibid.: 24).
But why would it be “like jumping over our own shadows”? I am inclined 
to interpret Arendt’s ‘shadow’ as being that which one might otherwise call 
‘rationality’. This would, therefore, be another way of stating what Davidson 
(2004: 123) means when he speaks of the “irreducibility of the mental to the 
physical.” Why have so many anthropologists failed to grasp this? We seem to 
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have broken the bridge, effaced our steps, and wiped out the trail that led from 
our common human condition to our complex ethnographic grappling with 
human difference. Yet these are mutually interdependent.
Epistemology and Free Will
As we attempt to understand better the conditions of possibility posed by anthro-
pological (and, by implication, ethnological) knowledge, ours is an issue of epis-
temology. One often thinks of epistemology, however, in purely intellectualist 
terms, as if one could discuss thought without also discussing the relationship 
of humans to the world. This, however, is both impossible and undesirable. In 
response to sense perception, social beings construct beliefs about the world, 
and the selfsame stimulation also implies that they have an investment in 
the world. Humans are geared conjointly to both thought and action. Human 
thought, of course, is free from immediate physical determination—our will 
is, to a large extent, free; that, however, should not lead us to propose that the 
mental and the physical are distinct phenomena (Davidson 2005: 277).
That free will appears to be paradoxical is due as much to the way in which 
rationality inserts a new form of causality into the world as it is to the implicit 
presuppositions about the human actor—the disposition to consider the person 
not as socially constructed but as a bounded individual. Viveiros de Castro 
(1996: 121–122) calls our attention to the perpetual oscillation in Western 
thought, as he puts it, between “a naturalist monism (of which ‘sociobiol-
ogy’ is one of today’s avatars) and the ontological dualism of nature/culture 
(of which ‘culturalism’ is the contemporary expression).” His diagnostic is 
absolutely correct. However, driven as it is by an all-or-nothing dynamic, his 
discursivist medicine does not soothe our malaise.
A more sensible and constructive solution would be a compromise of the 
kind suggested by Davidson’s (2004) ‘anomalous monism’, that is, “the posi-
tion that says there are no strictly lawlike correlations between phenomena 
classified as mental and phenomena classified as physical, though mental enti-
ties are identical, taken one at a time, with physical entities. In other words, 
there is a single ontology, but more than one way of describing and explaining 
the items in the ontology” (ibid.: 121).
I emphasize that in anthropology, this is no ‘retro-prophecy’, to use Viveiros 
de Castro’s own ironical expression. Rather, it is only a more guarded solution 
to our present epistemological quandary. In his influential disquisitions con-
cerning Spinoza and the neurobiology of affects, António Damásio (2003) sup-
ports an approach essentially similar to mine. We must avoid the all-or-nothing 
disposition to think that when we highlight the importance of personhood, 
we are necessarily relaunching the modernist polarity individual/society; or 
that, as we identify the anomaly in our monism, we must be building upon 
the nature/culture polarity; or, finally, that to sustain the scientific character of 
anthropology means to engage in a modernist utopia of progress based on the 
primitive/civilized opposition.
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Four Negatives
To this I want to add some insights that I have derived from reading Hannah 
Arendt’s (1958: 233) debate on action. There, she explores a problem that is, 
in many ways, similar to the paradox of free will: humans act for reasons, yet 
their reasons can never fully explain their actions. 
While the strength of the process of production is entirely absorbed in and 
exhausted by the end product, the strength of the action process is never 
exhausted in a single deed but, on the contrary, can grow while its consequences 
multiply; what endures in the realm of human affairs are these processes, and 
their endurance is as unlimited, as independent of the perishability of material 
and the mortality of men as the endurance of humanity itself. The reason why 
we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome and end of any action 
is simply that action has no end. The process of a single deed can quite literally 
endure throughout time until mankind itself has come to an end.
Again, the source of our confusion lies not only in pretending to separate 
action from the world, but also in the nature of the presumed unit of reckon-
ing: the boundaries of personhood and of conscience can hardly be seen as the 
limits of action. Action is undertaken by persons and other social entities in a 
pre-existing world and is constitutive of them and of that world. To that extent, 
in Arendt’s image, it reverberates throughout time until mankind itself comes 
to an end. From this, Arendt derives the two main characteristics of action: it is 
both irreversible and unpredictable. Indeed, as it is constitutive of the actor/s 
and of the world, action can never be undone, unlike most processes of physi-
cal manipulation of the world that normally can be reversed or unmade. Fur-
thermore, as it depends on free will, action cannot be predictable. This leads 
us again to the initial question, to which we responded with the Davidsonian 
notion of anomalous monism.
The ethnographer is not free from the epistemologist’s quandary of hav-
ing to explain how he knows what he knows. In fact, in ethnography, two 
epistemological injunctions meet: the first is that of the ethnographer’s mode 
of knowing/acting; the second is that of the knowing/acting as that which 
she is studying. Ethnography and anthropology are activities aimed at com-
municating knowledge. So the issue of the reception of what is ‘done’—the 
epistemology of the receiver—is not to be discarded. Of course, how I write 
anthropology/ethnography is deeply related to the ethnography/anthropology 
I have learned. We will soon find ourselves in a hall of mirrors—a perverse hall 
of mirrors, for it is one that sidetracks the essential issue, focusing on second-
ary phenomena and thus giving the appearance of irresolubility. 
In fact, the essential issue is not these dialectics of knowledge reception (dis-
course on discourse), but rather the relation of ‘triangulation’, where meaning 
and action are at play. It is not all a matter of thought; it is a matter of thought 
in the world. Thus, the three sides of the triangle are all equally in need of being 
taken into account: (1) the thinker, (2) his or her others, and (3) the world that 
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surrounds them and gives sense to what they do. The indeterminacy of mean-
ing—which sustains that I will never be able to pin down precisely any mean-
ing whatsoever (any other person’s meanings, but also my own)—appears to 
enter into contradiction with the fact that we all share a common humanity, a 
human condition, which makes it possible for any two humans to reach a very 
considerable amount of understanding between them. These two injunctions, 
however, are hardly contradictory. They do not counter each other because they 
apply to different aspects of the same phenomenon. Their relation is necessarily 
one of constant approximation and constant differentiation. This is a sphere in 
which the paradox of Achilles and the arrow actually works. It will never have a 
final absolute solution, for this is ‘the realm of human action and speech’, and 
therefore Hannah Arendt’s injunctions are inescapable: action is always irre-
versible and unpredictable. It is the gap caused by the anomaly in our monism. 
The creative dialectic between the communality of the human condition and the 
ultimate ‘indeterminacy’ of communication explains why human action is not 
subject to a means-ends analysis. It is ultimately ‘underdeterminate’.
Bearing in mind this difference between indeterminacy and underdetermi-
nation, let us explore further this issue of meaning, for I believe that it clears 
the way to interesting insights concerning the possibilities and the limits of 
ethnographic reporting and anthropological theorizing. Essentially, following 
Quine, the argument is that “what we can say and understand about the 
propositional attitudes of others should be what we can capture by matching 
up our own sentences to those attitudes” (Davidson 2001: 77). This is essen-
tially a negative thesis, that is, one that establishes limits, countering more 
optimistic views concerning the possibilities of interpretation. Davidson (2005: 
317) asserts that this approach “is an attack on the idea that meanings can be 
captured in exactly one way” (2005: 317). As Davidson puts it: “[S]entences 
can be used in endless different ways to keep track of the attitudes of others, 
and of the meanings of their sentences … there is no more to the identification 
of meanings than is involved in capturing those complex empirical relations” 
(ibid.). Thus, as it is never absolute, interpretation is always basically indeter-
minate and dependent on a relationship between the one who interprets, the 
one who is interpreted, and the world that surrounds them and without which 
there would be no referential context for interpretation.
The point of the matter is not that what is described is in any way less real. 
The notion of having direct access to other people’s categories is, after all, an 
absurdity, once we give up a representational theory of meaning. Nor is indeter-
minacy a factor of there being two or more persons involved. Davidson (2005: 
316) reminds us that “[i]ndeterminacy occurs whenever a vocabulary is rich 
enough to describe a phenomenon in more than one way,” and that, “[g]iven 
the richness of all natural languages, it would be surprising if it were not always 
possible to describe the facts of any discipline in many ways” (ibid.: 317). I take 
“richness” here to mean the fact that in language and in what anthropologists 
call culture is inscribed a vast plurality of different and divergent perspectival 
objectifications. Language and culture accumulate the traces of an innumerable 
series of diverse perspectives, identifications, options, practices, and gestures.
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One preliminary point is that one must follow Davidson’s lead in setting 
aside the concept of ‘translation’, substituting instead ‘interpretation’. The 
notion that ethnography involves translation is often used in a misleading fash-
ion (even though part of what the ethnographer does is, indeed, to translate) 
because of the centrality it places on the purely ideational aspects of social 
engagement (languages, cultures, discourses). On the contrary, ethnography 
involves the setting of what one hears into contexts of what one observes; 
without that triangulation, it would not be ethnography but literary analysis.7 
The equating of ethnography with translation presumes that there is some sort 
of equivalence between the ethnographer and his or her subjects, as if what the 
ethnographer does is to translate between two languages of the same kind—the 
native’s language and ‘our’ language (that mysteriously underspecified first 
person plural of imperial anthropological theory). 
Both of these are grave errors, for, contrary to when I carry out textual 
analysis, what I do when I write an ethnographic monograph is not, and is 
not intended to be, of the same nature as what the people I describe do when 
they do what I describe. Ethnography presumes anthropology in the same way 
that anthropology presumes ethnography. In no way can the ethnographic 
encounter be satisfactorily described as a “discourse about the discourse 
of a native” (Viveiros de Castro 2002: 113). Such a description goes clearly 
against the accumulated evidence of our methodological legacy. As is so often 
the case, Malinowski’s frankness has a quality of depth and innocence that 
reveals what later came to be hidden. In the preface to the first edition of The 
Sexual Life of Savages, Malinowski ([1929] 1931: xlviii) declares that in this 
study, “when I make a simple statement without illustrating it from personal 
observation or adducing facts, this means that I am mainly relying on what 
I was told by my native informants. This is, of course, the least reliable part 
of my material.”
Concerning the relationships between ethnography and anthropology, we 
must attend to Davidson’s (2005) argument that “there are endless things that 
may happen next, many of which would confirm theories at odds with our 
present theories. This is underdetermination. Indeterminacy is not like this; no 
amount of evidence, finite or infinite, would decide whether to measure areas 
in acres or hectares” (ibid.: 318; emphasis added). It is easy to see that both 
underdetermination and indeterminacy play a role in both anthropology and 
ethnography, but they do so differently. In anthropological theorizing, we aim 
to provide means to compare the practices of humans in social environments, 
whereas in ethnographic description and interpretation, we aim to describe 
these same practices.
From this perspective, then, we could see ethnography as being doubly 
indeterminate. This is so, firstly, because the act of someone interpreting what 
others think and do always presumes a level of indeterminacy in the interpre-
tation (a fortiori if the two parties come from different socio-cultural back-
grounds). Secondly, when I engage in ethnography, I am, so to speak, shifting 
modes of knowledge, that is, from practical knowledge that is applied in real-
life circumstances to a theoretically informed style of knowledge that is meant 
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to be transmitted, not in the practical forms of real-life engagements, but in 
a mediated mode (written, read, or in audiovisual record) that is interpreted 
by reference to a comparative framework controlled by the critical methods of 
scientific reporting and citation. Ethnography presumes a shift in the mode of 
interpretation: from general lived practice to theoretical practice, a distinctly 
idiosyncratic type of lived practice. Ethnography presumes anthropology. The 
ethnographer interprets not for herself but for others whose further interpreta-
tions occur in a context that is radically different from that within which the 
ethnographer gathered her information. Whether or not we choose to believe 
in the automatic privilege of illumination that such ‘distancing’ confers on 
us—as Bourdieu and others have done—is quite another matter.
To proceed with the argument, however, we could see anthropology as 
being characterized by a ‘double’ underdetermination. Firstly, like all scientific 
accounts, it can capture only part of the causes that determine social becom-
ing and thus will never be able fully to predict them. Secondly, it depends on 
ethnography for the gathering of its materials, and the latter is limited by the 
indeterminacy of interpretation. Thus, anthropology, like all other social and 
human disciplines, will never be able “fully [to] explain or predict any event 
under a physical description” (Davidson 2005: 309).
Again, to follow Davidson (2005: 306) in his essay on Spinoza, “mental 
and physical concepts belong to independent explanatory systems.” And yet, 
due to the very requirements of interpretation, the anthropologist will never 
be able to account for human social behavior without making some reference 
to the world of things, the physical world within which it all takes place. In 
short, ultimately, there is no such thing as ‘virtual’ sociality. The anthropologist 
must ‘triangulate’ between (1) her understanding, (2) the thoughts and deeds 
of others, and (3) the physical world within which all social life occurs. Here, 
we come back to Needham’s (1985) fascinating parable concerning the actual 
impossibility of inventing an ethnography and sustaining its verisimilitude—
the story of Dr. Johnson’s friend, Psalmanazar, who concocted an apparently 
realistic account of an invented society in the far-off island of Florida, today’s 
Taiwan (cf. Pina-Cabral 2003).
All this becomes especially relevant when one addresses the complex issue 
of affects—the way in which external events affect one’s own internal disposi-
tions toward one’s self. In particular, any anthropological approach to affects 
(cf. Damásio 2003) must take into account the indeterminacy of interpretation, 
since any one of us possesses more than one language to describe our own 
affects, let alone those of others, and the underdetermination of explanation, 
since it will never be possible to identify all the factors that would be involved 
in the complex triangulation between what a person feels, how that is deter-
mined by his relations to others, and how all that is dependent on complex 
modes of physical causation (both environmental and organic).
By now, it will have been noted that these four categories—irreversibility, 
unpredictability, indeterminacy, and underdetermination—are all in some way 
negations. That might lead us to throw down our arms and give up on a task 
that is so dependent on what it is not. But here, precisely, is where we return to 
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Quine’s luminous insight: indeterminacy does not prevent translation; on the 
contrary, it is a condition for it. Once meaning stops being for us something 
that actually exists in a person’s head (a kind of picture present in the indi-
vidual mind) and becomes a form of action—an activity of relating—indeter-
minacy is no longer to be seen as a negative, limiting feature, but as a positive 
asset. Furthermore, we must be aware that behind our capacity to translate (or 
better yet, in Davidson’s terms, to interpret) the speech and action of others, 
there is an ethical posture that Davidson called a ‘charity’—a disposition to 
believe that other people can make sense. Our capacity to understand others is 
based on our ethical constitution as human beings.
Faced with the incapacity to formulate basic human interchange in terms 
of crisp Aristotelian concepts and a theory of representations, anthropologists 
opted for a kind of instinctivist notion of human empathy in a Geertzian mold.8 
This, however, was a weak-kneed, conservative response. It should have been 
clear from the start that concepts based or dependent upon natural language 
cannot be susceptible to the Aristotelian ‘laws of bivalence’ (the famous laws 
of the ‘excluded middle’ and of ‘non-contradiction’) and should not be seen as 
a limitation. The industrial success of ‘fuzzy logic’ should help us realize that. 
What is suggested by the four features of action and interpretation identified 
above is that, as with fuzzy logic, we must focus on human sensitivity to error. 
Our dependence on error may allow for the possibility of getting things at least 
partially right. These are not variables that apply solely to ethnography/anthro-
pology; rather, they apply to all action and to all interpretation.
Conclusion
This being the case, my conclusion is guardedly realist. Much like Davidson 
and Arendt, I believe that those who choose to dabble in virtuality and hall 
of mirrors aesthetics are giving up too soon. They are failing to see something 
very essential, not about anthropology as such, but about the human condi-
tion. Apparently, some of our more distinguished colleagues have toyed with 
the idea that the discursive reduction would bypass the epistemological prob-
lem, but the fact is that so long as we remain bound to the sort of things social 
scientists do (i.e., empirical research and systematization, critical analysis and 
theoretically informed reporting, claims to specialist status), the epistemologi-
cal question is not going to go away. 
In fact, by now, as the years run their course, the all-or-nothing syndrome 
is becoming increasingly depressing. After all that soul searching, after the 
deeply humbling experience of discovering that the knowledge we produced 
was just like any other knowledge, we found out that we had no courage to 
ask for a divorce. We continued to receive our salaries, to train students, to 
draw out research funds, to stick to methodological procedures, to observe 
critical standards, and even to claim a privileged voice concerning politically 
weighted social issues. 
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Such a situation cannot last much longer. Sooner or later, we will have to 
ask ourselves whether we really have done away with science, in what we 
stubbornly continue to call the social sciences, and with concern for the human 
condition, in what we stubbornly continue to call anthropology. And the evi-
dence is that we have not, which suggests that, after all, our deflationist fancies 
are not much more than a conservative literary conceit.
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Notes
 1. Note that I use the word ‘discursivist’ here in a very general sense to cover all types of 
theoretical dispositions that focus essentially on the communicational aspects of human 
sociality and favor intellectualist analyses over a grounding of human interaction in a 
shared world. Thus, I include in the category not only the explicit culturalist approaches 
inspired by Geertz and David Schneider but also those inspired by Foucault or Deleuze. 
 2. Compare with the debate in Anthropology Today, which followed from our original dis-
cussion of these issues in the panel “Anthropological Evidence and Its Culture” at the 
2003 American Anthropological Association meeting in Chicago. See Richard A. Wilson 
(2004), Knut C. Myhre (2006), and Brian Morris (2007). 
 3. Note that here I am using the term ‘belief’ in the sense of ‘propositional attitude’—not 
in the sense of ‘believe in’, which Needham (1972) rightly criticized in Belief, Language 
and Experience, but rather in the sense of ‘believe that’ (cf. Ruel [1982] 2002).
 4. While one cannot fail to agree with Marilyn Strathern’s criticism of sociocentrism (see 
Strathern 1992b: 97), throwing holism as a methodology down the drain with it is a seri-
ous error of judgment, to my mind.
 5. And that shared world, of course, includes a body—as Christina Toren (2002: 106) puts 
it, “the kind of body of which [the mind] is an aspect is crucial to its workings.”
 6. Compare with Toren (2002: 110–113).
 7. And even literary analysis requires triangulation with the world.
 8. Compare with the canonical formulation of this notion in the introduction to Vincent 
Crapanzano’s Tuhami (1980: xi).
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